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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROCON CORPORATION,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, :
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the lower Court erred, as a matter of law,

in admitting exhibit 18-P (a letter dated April 14, 1986 which
purports to give notice of Plaintiff-Appellees intention to seek
added payment for moving the waste disposal area) in view of a
lack of foundation to admit said exhibit.
2.

Whether the lower Court erred, as a matter of law,

in its award of damages for moving the waste area which is based
on its Finding of Fact No. 21, which states that DefendantAppellant was on notice that the change in the waste area
location would increase the cost of performance as a result of
exhibit 18-P when Appellant's engineer testified he had neither
seen the said letter nor been verbally informed to that effect,
and the purported author of the said letter could not recall the
letter nor events referred to therein.

3. Whether the lower Court erred, both as a matter of
law and factually, in awarding damages for the change in the
slope angle of the sliver cut in view of the fact that the
evidence supporting the decision of the court is based upon the
perjured testimony of James Didericksen which is contrary to all
of the other evidence.
4.

Whether the lower Court erred in awarding damages,

the amount of which appears to be influenced by passion and
prejudice and expressed feelings of sympathy toward the
Plaintiff-Appellee.
5.

Whether the Court erred, as a matter of law, in

awarding damage based upon the testimony of Gaylord Gardner,
which testimony was based on a total cost type approach and which
assumed facts not in evidence.
6.

Whether the Court erred, both as a matter of law

and fact, in awarding damages for overtime incurred by PlaintiffAppellee when it failed to complete the work within the time
allowed after a substantial increase in contract time.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review for the first, second, fourth,
fifth and sixth issues on appeal is a correction of error
standard.1

The standard of review for the third issue on

1

Western Kane County Special Service District v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2 138
(Utah App. 1989.)

2

appeal is a clearly erroneous standard.2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a highway construction contract case.

Procon

Corporation (Procon), and the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) entered into a contract on March 11, 1986, for the
realignment of a failed section of highway number 276 in San Juan
County near Clay Hills Pass. The contract involved the
excavation of a "sliver cut" and the widening of a fill to
realign the roadway.

Excess material was to be placed in a

compacted fill as specified in the plans.
The contract allowed 90 working days for completion of
the work.

Procon exceeded the allowed time by 71 working days.

In early 1987, Procon's bonding company became insolvent.

Procon

was unable to provide substitute payment and performance bonds.
The contract was terminated by agreement effective January 1,
1987, with a reservation of rights by each party.
the project in 1987.

UDOT completed

Procon filed a claim for added compensation

totaling in excess of 2.2 million dollars, three times the amount
of the original contract. UDOT employed an engineering firm to
review Procon's claim.

Their independent conclusion was that

Procon's claims were not well founded, and UDOT rejected them in
total.
At trial Procon claimed that because of changes made in
2

This standard, as it applies to the Perjured testimony of
James Didericksen and the Courts view concerning same is analyzed
beginning at page 32 of Appellant's brief.
3

the location of the waste disposal area and sliver cut slope
angle, it incurred added expense.

Procon alleged errors in the

plans were misleading and caused added expense.

Procon's

evidence concerning damages at trial was approximately 1/3 of the
amount it claimed initially.

UDOT denied responsibility for

Procon's damages. UDOT asserted the plans were adequate for
their intended purpose and that Procon's damages related to their
choice of equipment and method of operation.

UDOT alleged Procon

had notice of the slope angle change prior to bidding and
asserted that the change made by UDOT's engineer in the location
of the waste disposal area was not a material change.
UDOT alleged it did not receive written notice of
Procon's intent to claim added compensation for changes made by
the engineer as required by the contract.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Trial Court
The case was tried to the Court on July 9-12 and 16,
1991.
Procon's owner and principal officer, James
Didericksen, testified concerning performance of the contract,
the effect of changes in the contract, and conditions encountered
which he claimed were different from the plans.

He alleged that

Procon's damages exceeded two million dollars and that he and his
wife had lost everything and still owed numerous creditors.
Procon's two expert witnesses used various methods to
assess damages, including the use of assumed facts by the witness
Gaylord Gardner.

The range of opinion varied between
4

approximately $500,000 and $721,000,
UDOT's engineer testified that he informed prospective
bidders including Procon of the slope change in the "sliver cut
section" prior to the bid.

The Court relied on Didericksen's

obviously perjured testimony concerning this pre-bid conversation
and ignored all other evidence and awarded damages for the
change.
The UDOT engineer provided for a slope to support
placement of the waste material as required by the plans. The
slope extends beyond the designated waste location.

UDOT's

engineer did not receive verbal or written notice that Procon
viewed the change as a compensable change, and he did not
consider the extension to be a material or compensable change.
The Court admitted a letter in evidence, as a business record,
over objection by UDOT's counsel.

The letter purports to put

UDOT on notice of Procon's intent to claim added compensation.
The purported author of the letter did not recall the letter nor
events and facts referred to in the letter when his deposition
was taken prior to trial and did not testify at trial. No other
evidence of any kind was presented in support of the letter or,
to show that Procon notified UDOT of its intent to claim added
compensation for the said change.
The Court adopted the testimony of Gaylord Gardner as
the measure of damages for the waste area change even though
Gardner admitted his opinion was based on assumptions which are
not part of the evidence.

5

A post-trial motion by UDOT sought a modification of
the judgment and permission to supplement the record with
evidence referred to during the course of the trial.

The Court

admitted the supplementary evidence but refused to modify or
change the judgment of $721,478.00 plus interest.
C

Designation of the Parties

Procon Corporation was the Plaintiff in the trial and
is the Appellee here, and hereafter throughout this brief, will
be referred to as Procon.
The Utah Department of Transportation was the Defendant
at trial, is the Appellant here, and will hereafter be referred
to as UDOT throughout this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
a.

Procon and UDOT entered into a contract on or about

March 11, 1986 in the amount of $719,000 for repair work and
realignment to State Road 276 in San Juan County.

Said project

is a federally-aided project designated as Project Number ER052 (1), Clay Hills Pass3
b.

The project consisted of excavation into an

existing cut face and the realignment of the highway in the cut
section as well as the widening of a fill as the roadway emerges
from the cut.

The entire project limits encompass a length of

approximately one-half mile.

The project was necessitated

because the existing roadway, part of which was built on fill,

'Findings of Fact (Findings) 11 3, 7, 8, and Ex. 3-P.
6

was slipping into a drainage channel.
c.

The cut section is referred to as a "sliver cut."

It increases in width as the roadway proceeds down through the
cut section.

The height of the existing cut face

was

approximately 200 feet above the existing roadway at its deepest
point5
d.

The fill section was approximately 200 feet deep at

the toe of the widened fill section.

The fill required to

accommodate the roadway is widest at the point where the newly
aligned roadway emerges from the cut and narrows progressively
until it meets the original alignment several hundred feet east
of the cut6
e.

The plans specified that the waste material was to

be disposed of "right of highway stations 864+25 through 867+25."
Right of Station 867+25 approximately, the mountain drops away
and the roadway emerges from the cut.

The plans also specified

that fill slopes were to be sloped at an angle of 2~to 1; that
cut slopes over 5 feet in depth were to be excavated at an angle
of 1/2 to l; and that the roadway section was to be compacted to
95% density and the waste material was to be compacted to 90%
density7
f.

Procon's owner James Didericksen, Larry Fillmore, a

4

Findings 1 12# Ex. 2-P and Ex. 3-P.

5

Ex. 2-P.

6

Exhibit 2-P.

7

Findings 1 12, Ex. 2-P and Ex. 3-P.
7

Procon employee, and Abde Fatemi, an employee of Staker
Contracting, visited the project site prior to preparing and
submitting their bids in the company of Hugh Kirkham, the
Resident Engineer for UDOT.

Kirkham informed them during the

visit, among other things, that the sliver cut was to be removed
at an angle to match the existing slope (which was 1 to 1)
contrary to the plans which specified 1/2 to l8
g.

At the time of the site visit, stakes were in place

showing the centerline of the new highway alignment.

Stakes were

in place in the cut section which defined the configuration of
the cut section at the top of^the cut.
to as "slope" stakes.

Such stakes are referred

Stakes were not in place in the fill area

except for the new centerline9
h.

The notes of the site visit, prepared by Procon's

owner James Didericksen, state that, "Mr. Kirkham, P.E. pointed
out area by showing centerline stakes cut slope 1:1 approx 200'
fill gorge 200' deep."

and:

"Cut area beginning at sliver cut

approx 200' exist rd. maintain approx 1:1 slope. Also a diagram
on p. 11 shows the cut area with notations of 1:1 slope and 200'
top. Also fill area, 200' deep, Embankment 95%, Waste area 90%
compaction.10
i. Didericksen admitted in his deposition that he was
informed by Kirkham of the slope angle change during the pre-bid
8

R. 6 4 2 - 6 4 4 , F i n d i n g s 1 2 5 .

9

R. 6 3 3 - 6 3 5 ,

10

647.

Ex. 8 - P , p p . 7, 1 0 , 1 1 .
8

site visit.11

Didericksen claimed that they contacted Kirkham

prior to bid opening by telephone to ascertain if an addendum to
the plans had been issued covering the slope angle change and
that Kirkham said no and that they were to "bid it as drawn."12
The said phone call was allegedly made by Larry Fillmore.13
Kirkham stated that he did not recall any telephone conversation
with Fillmore or Didericksen prior to bid opening.

He stated his

intent was always to require that the slope be excavated on a 1
to 1 angle.14
j.

UDOT Standard Specifications authorize the engineer

to make directed changes to plans and obligate the contractor to
comply with such directives subject to certain restrictions.15
k.

At trial# Didericksen, testified that the slope

angle change was not discussed with Kirkham prior to bid opening.
This is contrary to his deposition, his pre-trial notes and
Kirkham's testimony.16
1.

Exhibit 18-P is a letter dated April 14f 1986, a

copy of which was found in Procon's files, and which was prepared
for the signature of Larry Fillmore.

Said letter states in part:

". . .we have been informed by Bill Thomas of a directed change
11

R. 959.

12

R. 959-960.

13

R. 649-650.

14

R. 649-650.

15

Ex. 5-P, S e c t i o n 1 0 4 . 0 2 .

16

R. 619.
9

in the location of the designated waste fill area from that which
is indicated on Sheet 3 of the bid plans.

These changes will us

impact [sic] significantly; therefore, we will keep track of
costs and inform you as to the impact at a later date once they
have been determined."17
m.

No copy of the said April 14, 1986, letter exists

in UDOT files. Hugh Kirkham testified that he did not receive
the said letter during performance of the work and did not see it
until April 1990 when Procon's counsel produced it during
discovery.

He also stated that no verbal objection was ever made

to him about this alleged change or extension in the location of
the waste area by anyone associated with Procon until after the
work was done.18
Counsel objected to the said letter when preferred at
trial based on lack of foundation.19

The purported author,

Fillmore, did not appear at trial and no one else testified to
its origin, preparation or mailing.

After initially ruling in

favor of UDOT, the Court reversed itself and admitted the
letter.20
n.

The plans specify that fill slopes are to be placed

at an angle of 2 to 1.

Because the terrain east and south of the

cut drops as much as 200 feet, the required slope extends up to
17

Findings, 1 21 and Ex. 18-P.

18

R. 657-658.

19

R. 317-321.

20

R. 610-611.
10

400 feet to the east.21

Kirkham staked the slope to begin

against the widened fill slope of the new roadway alignment and
extended it to the south.22

Kirkham did not perceive the slope

extension which was necessary to support the waste fill as a
compensable change or as a material change since Procon had to
haul material to build the roadway fill to the same elevation as
the waste fill designated in the plans.23
o.

UDOT Standard Specifications which are part of the

contract require written notice by the contractor as a precondition to a claim for added compensation when a "change in
plan or in the character of construction" is directed by the
engineer.

Failure to give the requisite notice is considered a

waiver of the claim.24
p.

Procon's testimony at trial was that the said

change in the location of the waste area forced a change in their
method of operation and that they were required to haul material
which they planned to push with a bulldozer, and that this was
much more costly.
$507,300.25

Procon's witnesses estimated as much as

UDOT's witness, Norman Clyde, recognized some

$3,500 in added haul costs.26
21

R. 652-653.

^R. 693-694.
a

R. 685-686.

24

See S e c t i o n 1 0 5 . 1 7 , Exhibit 5-P.

25

Findings 1 20, 2 4 .

26

R. 823-825.
11

q.

The contract specified 90 working days to complete

the work. A total of 161 working days were charged to the
project as of December 1, 1986 when time charges were
suspended.27

Procon's bonding company thereafter became

insolvent, and Procon was unable to replace the payment and
performance bonds so the contract was terminated by agreement as
of January 1# 1987.28
r.

After the project was completed, Procon was granted

added time, because of increased quantities of roadway excavation
and for added work totaling 14.68 days.29 This resulted in the
assessment of 56.32 days of liquidated damages rather than 71
days.

Hugh Kirkham testified that he had not formally responded

to Procon's requests for added time during the project
performance since time extensions required federal approval and
it was his judgment that it would have been better to seek one
extension at the end.30
would be reasonable.31

He stated that as much as 60 days
With a total extension of 60 days,

Procon would still have been liable for 11 days of liquidated
damages.
s.

At the time of the pre-bid site visit, Hugh Kirkham

stated that the contractor who constructed the road initially had
27

R. 665.

28

Findings 1 52.

29

R. 169.

30

R. 663-666.

31

R. 687.
12

successfully ripped the material in the cut with Caterpillar D-9
tractors and a single tooth ripper32.

Procon did not use D-9

tractors but used a Komatsu 155 Tractor and encountered
difficulty in ripping some of the material in the cut.33

As a

result, Procon elected to drill and blast material, which Procon
alleged caused an increase in cost of $116,000.^ UDOT
contended that the decision to rip or to blast is the
contractor's choice and not the responsibility of UDOT.35
t.

The court awarded Procon a judgment totalling

$721,478.00 plus interest following the trial.

Included in said

sum is $507,300 for the 300-foot extension in the waste area
location, $43,750 for added costs associated with the change in
the angle of excavation in the sliver cut, $116,000 for the cost
of blasting and $33,000 for overtime incurred in an effort to
complete the project within allowable time, which they did not
do.36
u.

UDOT filed a motion to have the court reconsider

the damage award and also objected to certain of Procon's
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.37

The Court heard said

^R. 645.
33

R. 680-682.

*R. 314.
35

Ex. 36-P.

36

Findings 11 24, 3 1 , 40, 50, 5 1 ; Conclusions of Law H 8,

12 •
37

R. 110-176.
13

Motion and UDOT's OBJECTION TO PROCON'S COST BILL, on February
14, 1992, and rejected UDOT's Motion in total except as to
Procon's Cost Bill.
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Procon encountered difficulty in performing the work
because it lacked adequate equipment and its concept of
operations was unrealistic and ill-conceived.

Procon's method of

operations involved excess handling of material and as a result
its daily production was only one-half of the amount on which its
bid was premised.

This resulted in greatly elevated levels of

direct and indirect costs.
Deficiencies in the plans and specifications were not a
contributing factor to Procon's job performance.

The plans were

adequate for their intended purpose and were such that a
reasonably competent contractor could easily perform the work.
Changes made by UDOT's engineer in the field were
typical of the type of changes routinely made in highway
construction.

They were either not of a material or significant

nature, or in the case of the change in the slope angle in the
"sliver cut" area, the change was made and notice communicated in
time to allow Procon to bid in anticipation of said change.
UDOT's argument is directed specifically at the lack of
notice by Procon of its intent to claim added compensation for an
alleged change in the waste disposal area.

UDOT also argues that

the court erred in admitting a letter which purports to give

14

notice into evidence without adequate foundation.
UDOT also argues that the court's award of damages for
a change in the slope angle of the sliver cut is in error for the
reason stated above.

UDOT argues further that the court erred in

admitting evidence of damages based on improper methods of
calculating same or on assumptions not supported by the evidence.
UDOT also argues that the court erred in awarding
damages for overtime wages for the reason that they are
unwarranted and inequitable.

UDOT also alleges that the judgment

appears to have been rendered under the influence of passion and
prejudice and unwarranted feelings of sympathy to Procon which is
clearly evident in that the court awarded judgment in an amount
which approximately doubled the original bid amount.
Finally, UDOT seeks a reversal of damages awarded for
moving the waste area, the change in the angle of excavation in
the "sliver cut" area and for overtime wages and a dismissal of
Procon's complaint as to said items.

In the alternative, UDOT

seeks a reversal of the entire judgment and a remand of the case
to the District Court for a new trial with appropriate
instructions.
POINT I.
PROCON FAILED TO NOTIFY UDOT OF ITS INTENTION
TO CLAIM ADDED COMPENSATION FOR AN ALLEGED
CHANGE IN THE LOCATION OF THE AREA DESIGNATED
IN THE PLANS FOR THE PLACEMENT OF WASTE
MATERIAL, AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACT, AND
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED THEREON
SHOULD BE REVERSED

15

A. Sections 104.02(4) And 105.17 Of The
Standard Specifications Applicable To The
Contract Require The Contractor To Notify The
Engineer Of The Contractors Intention To
Claim Added Compensation If The Contractor
Disagrees With Changes Or Directives Made By
The Engineer.
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications
applicable to the contract38 authorizes the Engineer to direct
changes in quantities, alter details of construction, and to
change the design of the project at any time.
required to comply with such directives.

The contractor is

This power is limited

by certain restrictions set forth in said section.

The

contractor is obligated to "demand" a supplemental agreement "in
writing" if the directed change constitutes "A change in the
nature of the design or in the character of construction which
measurably increases or decreases the unit cost of performing any
item of the work."39

The said section also contains the

following pertinent language:
Written requests for a supplemental agreement
under condition (4) shall set forth in detail
the particulars and character by which the
work was changed and by what amounts the unit
costs of the contract items will be altered.
The failure of the engineer to recognize a
change in the character of the work when
ordering alterations in the work shall in no
way be construed as relieving the contractor
from his duty and responsibility for filing a
request for supplemental agreement.
If a request for additional compensation is
made by the contractor and the engineer does
Ex. 5-P, Sec. 104.02.
>Ex. 5-P, Sec. 104.02(4) .
16

not consider that a change, as ordered, will
measurably increase or decrease the unit cost
of performing the work, he may order the work
to proceed at the contract prices. The
validity of the claim will be considered in
accordance with provisions in Section 105.17.
Section 105.17 of the Standard Specifications is entitled "Claims
for Adjustment and Disputes."40

It reads as follows in

pertinent part:
If, in any case, where the contractor deems
that additional compensation is due him for
work or material not clearly covered in the
contract or not ordered by the engineer as
extra work as defined herein, the contractor
shall notify the engineer in writing of his
intention to make claim for such additional
compensation before he begins the work on
which he bases the claim. If such
notification is not given and the engineer is
not afforded proper facilities by the
contractor for keeping strict account of
actual cost as required, then the contractor
hereby agrees to waive any claim for such
additional compensation. (Emphasis added.)
* * *

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
as establishing any claim contrary to the
terms of Subsection 104.02.
B. The Engineer For UDOT Did Not Consider
The Extension Of The Waste Area To Be A
Compensable Change Under Sections 104.02 or
105.17.
The central issue involved in this case is whether the
extension of the waste area beyond the limits of the area
designated in the plans constitutes a compensable change.
fact, $507,300 out of a total principal sum of $721,478.00
awarded as Judgment is based on this alleged change.
'Ex. 5-P, Sec. 105.17.
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In

The plans41 provide that material excavated from the
cut section be used in two areas*

One area is the new roadway

embankment necessary to support the new highway alignment in the
fill area east of the cut section.

The extra material from the

cut section not needed in the highway embankment is referred to
as a "waste" material.

The plans specify that it is to be placed

"right of highway stations 864+25 through 867+25"42. The waste
material requires compaction to 90% density, and the roadway
embankment requires 95% compaction.43
UDOT's engineer, Hugh Kirkham, explained in his
testimony at trial that the terrain at engineer station 867+25
drops away in two directions to the south and to the east.

He

then stated the following:
At that point was where the waste fill was
to start to the south, and when you observe
that, if you did, you had a slope here that
would be standing vertical. So we determined
we had to put a 2 to 1 slope easterly to hold
that. And that's where we began slope
staking because of the 200 foot height that
approximates 867, would be put it at about
400 feet ahead, or around 871• So we
determined that we'd establish the 2 to 1
slope for this supporting fill here at this
point, coming back to meet the daylight area,
and then carry the slope south on the 2 to 1
and bring 'em back in where we went with the

41

Ex. 2-P.

42

The first three numbers indicates the base station and
these are positioned 100 feet apart. In this case, the
designated area begins 25 feet beyond station 864 and continues
300 feet to a point 25 feet beyond station 867.
43

Ex. 2-P.
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daylight,44
Kirkham also explained in his testimony that the 2 to 1 slope is
a contract requirement.

In response to questions by Procon's

counsel, he stated the following:
The typical section says 2 to 1 slope on all
fills. On typical No. 1, sheet 2, on the
right hand side it says, 2 to 1 over five
foot in fills.45
Question: (Babcock) Is typical 1 reflective
of waste or embankment?
Answer: (Kirkham) It's a fill being placed
on the job so it would be applicable on this
project either the waste or the embankment.
That would be on the left. I said that
wrong.
Question: (Babcock) It's typical No. 1 on
the left where it says 2 to 1 over five foot
fills. Is that correct, Mr. Kirkham?
Answer:

(Kirkham)

Yes, that is.

Judge Young: And the other on the right is 2
to 1 under five foot cuts.
Question: (Babcock) It's actually shown on
an embankment cross section, isn't it? Isn't
that what typical No. 1 is, through an
embankment upper cut and the fill off the
side of an embankment?
Answer: Yes, it's the typical section for
the project.
Question: (Babcock) Is waste material
placed in a typical section area?
Answer: It doesn't indicate it but on this
project it was to be part of the construction

a

R. 652, 653.

45

Sheet 2 is a plan sheet found in Ex. 2-P.
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so it was applicable to that/6
Kirkham considered the placement of the 2 to 1 slope to
be a contract requirement necessary to support the waste material
which the plans provided was to be placed right of the station's
previously referred to.
Kirkham also explained that in his opinion the
placement of the material in the 2 to 1 slope was no more
difficult than placing it within the designated waste disposal
area.47
This Court in the case of Thorn Const. Co. v. UDOT. 598
P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) held that where the engineer verbally
directed a change in the scope of the work that UDOT could not
rely on the lack of written notice as a defense to a claim for
added compensation.

The fact situation in the Thorn case is

distinguishable from the facts of this case.

In Thorn the

directed work was clearly outside the scope of the plans.
an addition to the plans.

It was

In this case the staking of the 2 to 1

slope beyond the specific waste area designated was considered by
UDOT's engineer to be encompassed within the scope of the plans
which required a 2 to 1 slope for fill sections where material
was placed.

This fact situation is more like the case of State

v. Omeaa Painting. Inc.. 463 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. App. 1984)

In that

case, which involved changes directed by the state's engineer and
a failure to notify the state in writing of any claim for relief,
*R. 682, 683 and Exhibit #2-P, Sheet 1.
47

R.

653, 685, 686.
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the court construed Indiana Standard Highway Specification Number
105.16 which is identical to UDOT Standard Specification
105.1748 set forth above.

The Court stated the following:

That section is clear and unambiguous. Absent the
requisite written notification, the contractor is
without recourse. When the terms of a contract are
plain and clear on the face of the document, such terms
are conclusive as to the meaning of the contract and
this court will apply the contract's provisions
according to the plain language of the document.
Reeder vT Ramsey. 458 N.E.2d 682 (Ind. App. 1984).
The court, after noting that the plaintiff did not
dispute that it failed to notify the engineer in writing pursuant
to the said section, states the following:
Accordingly, the contractor is precluded from raising
any claim for additional compensation unless it
demonstrates that the State waived compliance with
Section 105.16. This Omega has failed to do. Absent a
showing of waiver, the parties must be deemed to be
bound by the plain terms of the contract. See also
Watson Lumber v. Guennewia. 226 N.E.2d 220 (111. App.
1967).
The waste disposal area was staked by the UDOT crew to
reflect the required 2 to 1 slope.
Procon was apparently not concerned about the waste
area extension at the time it occurred (March 1986).

Procon's

superintendent, Bill Thomas, recorded in a field report dated
March 19, 1986 that "We can make switchbacks longer now that
waste area to south is to be expanded."49
The engineer did not consider the waste area extension
to provide the slope to be a compensable change.
*BEx. 5-P, Sec. 105.17.
49

R. 138.
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There was no

verbal discussion between the parties concerning it at any time
during performance of the contract.

This is exactly the

situation which the two specification sections quoted above in
subsection A contemplate.

It is the intent of those

specification sections that the owner be protected from claims
which the contractor may decide to assert, after the fact and
without prior written notice.
C. Finding of Fact Number 21 Which Found
That UDOT Was On Notice That The Change In
The Waste Area Would Increase Procon's Cost
Of Performance Is In Error Because UDOT Was
Never Informed Either Verbally Or In Writing
That Procon Intended To Claim Added
Compensation For The Alleged Change During
The Prpjectt
Hugh Kirkham testified that he did not see Procon's
letter dated April 14f 198650 which purports to put UDOT on
notice of Procon's intent to claim added compensation, until a
copy of the letter was handed to him several years after the
project was performed during trial preparation.51

He testified

that he checked UDOT files and records and that no original or
copy of the letter exists in UDOT files. He stated that he had
checked with his office manager and that he had not seen the
letter either.52

He also stated that the mail was delivered

directly to his office by U.S. Mail.53

50

Ex. 18-P.

51

R. 657.

52

R. 657.

53

R. 659.
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Other pertinent

correspondence which Procon originated was apparently received in
due course by UDOT.
Hugh Kirkham testified in response to a question
concerning a statement in the letter of April 14, 1986 from Larry
Fillmore (Ex. 18-P) which refers to a telephone conversation and
a "directed change in the designated waste area" that he did not
recall any conversation about a "directed change" or "any
conversation at all" and that, "I didn't feel we had changed the
waste area because we were starting at the, what was the end of
the waste area with our 2 to 1 slope."54

Kirkham stated that

the first time he realized that Procon was concerned about the
alleged change in the location of the waste fill area was during
trial preparation in April of 1990 when he first saw the April
14, 1986 letter.55 56
The record of the trial in this matter is totally
devoid of any evidence which relates to any verbal notice or
discussion between any Procon representative and UD^T's Engineer
Kirkham or any other UDOT official concerning the extension and/

54

R. 658.

55

R. 417.

56

It should be noted that Procon's letter of April 14, 1986
is referred to in the claim document filed by Procon (Ex. 34-P)
after the contract with Procon was terminated. The claim was
filed in late 1987 but Kirkham did not actually review the claim
document in any detail until April 1990. The claim itself was
filed by Procon with UDOT's chief construction engineer, Bert
Taylor, and was not forwarded to Kirkham. The precise point in
time that Kirkham discovered that Procon was concerned with the
change is of course irrelevant if it occurred after contract
performance which is in fact the case.
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or change in the location of the waste-fill area.

Finding of

Fact Number 21 is therefore totally reliant on Exhibit 18-P.
In order to challenge a finding of the Court based upon
factual evidence, it is necessary to marshall all the evidence
which the Court could conceivably rely upon to support its
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings even when it is viewed in
the light most favorable to the Court below.
Omaha. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

Reid v. Mutual of

We have already set out

Kirkham's uncontroverted statements which deny that any notice of
any kind was received by UDOT which relates to the waste area
change or extension during contract performance.

Jim Didericksen

stated that he was notified of the alleged change by his people
approximately March 20, 1986.57 Later in response to
questioning on voir dire, Mr. Didericksen admitted that he did
not talk to Kirkham about the April 14, 1986 letter.
18-P.)58

(Exhibit

He also testified that he did not send the said letter

and that he did not know who would have sent the letter.

He said

he assumed "it would have been Mr. Fillmore or my wife or
somebody. "59
Valerie Didericksen in her testimony referred to a
meeting with Kirkham near the end of May or the first of June
1986 but did not make reference to any discussion concerning the
57

R. 306.

58

R. 317.

59

R. 317.
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waste area or problems associated therewith.60

She did not

testify concerning the April 14# 1986 letter or anything referred
to in that letter.
Larry Fillmore, the supposed author of the disputed
April 14, 1986 letter did not testify at trial although it was
represented by counsel for Procon on the first day of trial that
he would.61

During the trial counsel for UDOT represented that

during the deposition of the said Fillmore which was taken on
September 1, 1989, he was asked concerning the April 14, 1986
letter he purportedly authored, and that he did not recall the
letter, nor facts and events referred to therein.

Following the

trial a Motion was brought by UDOT to reconsider the damage award
and to amend the judgment.

An excerpt from Fillmore's deposition

was received as a late filed exhibit.

In the deposition Fillmore

was asked about the letter and the reference in the letter to
"large material we have encountered and the location of the
designated waste area"?

In response to the specific question as

to whether he had an independent recollection of either of the
two specific items outside of the letter he stated:

"I

don't."62
In paragraph 3 of the said letter, the purported author
(Fillmore) states:
60

"As I stated, we have been informed by Bill

R. 408-412.

61

R. 318.

62

R. 136. The transcript does not reflect the exact
question. Counsel for UDOT was reading from the first paragraph
of the letter which reads as stated.
25

Thomas of a directed change in the location of the wastefill area
from that which is indicated on sheet 3 of the plans."

When

asked "Do you know what he's talking about there?" Fillmore
responded as follows:

"I don't, I can't recall the exact

specifics on that."63
Fillmore was asked added questions concerning the
project and the waste fill area but did not recall anything about
the letter, the events in the letter or anything related to that
part of the work.64
By way of summary as to the marshalling of evidence to
support Finding of Fact 21# we have the following:

1} Evidence

of the extension of the waste area to the east in order to
accommodate a 2 to 1 slope which Kirkham stated as being required
by the plans and necessary to support waste material placement
within the designated stationing.

2)

Kirkham's testimony that

he did not consider the slope which was staked and placed to be
outside the scope of the plans or to constitute a change which
would justify added compensation since it was no more costly to
place the material in the extension area than where the plans
provided.

3)

Kirkham's statements that no one associated with

Procon ever verbally informed him of any concern about the waste
area extension and that he was unaware of this concern until four
years later when he first saw a copy of the April 14, 1986
letter.

4) No evidence that anyone in Procon's organization

63

R. 137.

"R. 136-139.
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actually mailed the letter of April 14# 1986, or delivered a copy
of same to UDOT or that UDOT received the letter either by mail
or personal delivery during the project.

5)

No evidence that

anyone associated with Procon ever informed Kirkham or any UDOT
official of any concern as to the placement, change or extension
of the waste area beyond that shown in the plans during the life
of the project.

6) Some indication that while the change in

location was recognized by Procon on or before March 19, 1986,
that it was not an unwelcome change.

This is contrary to the

statement in the April 14, 1986 letter to UDOT concerning adverse
impact to Procon.

7) Finally, there is absolutely no evidence to

support the authenticity of Exhibit 18 except the statement of
Jim Didericksen that a copy of the letter was in the file and
that their practice was to keep copies of correspondence.65
There simply is no adequate foundation to support the court's
decision to admit Exhibit 18.
Finding of Fact 21 is based on the letter of April 14,
1986 (Exhibit 18-P) and the notice purportedly given UDOT about
the alleged change in the location of the waste area as contained
therein.
When Exhibit 18-P was offered through the witness James
Didericksen it was objected to for lack of foundation.
properly excluded the letter at that point.

The Court

Thereafter,

Didericksen testified that a copy of the letter was kept in the

'R. 318-320.
27

file and that this was the practice of the company.66

The Court

subsequently stated when 18-P was again proffered as follows:
"The testimony was that Mr, Didericksen stated that the letter
was in his file, and in his records kept by the corporation, and
that was the foundation you laid for that."

The Court: then

overruled UDOT's objection and received 18-P.67 The basis for
its acceptance is thus as a business record.
A leading case in this jurisdiction concerning the
business record exception to the hearsay rule (Subsection (6),
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence) is State ex rel. Marquez. 560
P.2d 342 (Utah 1977).

In that case, the Court held that the

general rule as to the admissibility of a record is that it is
within the prerogative of the trial court to make the
determination when a sufficient foundation has been laid.

In the

case of State v. Bertal. 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), the court set
guidelines to determine a "sufficient foundation" and stated four
things which are required to lay a foundation for a-business
record.

They are as follows:
(1) The record must be made in the regular course of
the business entity which keeps the records; (2) The
record must have been made at the time of, or in close
proximity to the occurrence of the act, condition or
event recorded; (3) The evidence must support a
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity;
and (4) The sources of the information from which the
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation
of the document were such as to indicate its
trustworthiness.

*R. 318-319.
67

R. 611.
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UDOT submits that under the criteria set out in Bertal. the Court
should have excluded 18-P.

The letter in question was dated at

least 26 days after Procon recognized the change which raises a
question as to the second requirement under Bertal. but it is the
fourth requirement which is of most concern because the
"circumstances of the preparation of the document" do not
indicate its trustworthiness since the purported author could not
recall the letter or events referred to therein and Jim
Didericksen did not know who prepared the letter or if the
original of it was ever sent.
The Court's Finding Number 21 is "clearly erroneous."
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets the standard
for the legal sufficiency of a Finding of Fact.

In pertinent

part that Rule states:
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses . . . .
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d at 899, the court states:
A finding attacked as lacking adequate
evidentiary support is deemed "clearly
erroneous" only if we conclude that the
finding is against the clear weight of the
evidence. Citing, In re Estate of Bartell.
776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) (mem op.); State v.
Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989); Western
Kane County Special Service Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah
1987) and State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
1987).
Procon is not entitled to a recovery for extra costs
associated with the waste area extension unless it can establish
29

that notice of its intention was properly communicated.

Simply

admitting the letter into evidence fails to establish the fact of
notice.

The evidence that the State did not receive notice is

uncontroverted.

Procon did not even establish who typed the

letter, who addressed the envelope, or if the letter was mailed,
and if mailed, who mailed it.

It is therefore clearly error for

the Court to find that UDOT was on notice of the fact that the
change in the waste area location would increase Procon's cost of
performance.

For the Court to admit the letter as a '"business

record" and to ignore the entire failure of all the other
evidence to support the finding that UDOT was on notice is not
only error but an abuse of discretion.
Unlike the fact situation in the Thorn case, there is
in this case no testimony concerning any oral communication about
the change in the waste disposal area.

The evidence rather shows

that the engineer enlarged the disposal area to accommodate the
slope and throughout the life of the project he did not receive
any oral or written notice that Procon objected to it in anyway
let alone considered that it was entitled to added compensation
as a result.
In summary, it is obvious that the Court should have
excluded Exhibit 18-P for lack of foundation.

The only

conceivable foundational facts were that a copy of the letter was
in the file and that their custom was to keep a copy of
correspondence.

Allowing the letter into evidence without

anything to support it except minimal evidence of the custom of
30

Procon to keep copies of correspondence is an invitation for
fraud.

Nothing in Exhibit 18-P is supported by any credible

evidence outside the letter itself.

The Court clearly committed

error in admitting the letter and using it as a basis for its
finding that UDOT was on notice of Procon's intent to seek added
payment for extending the waste disposal area.

There is no

evidence that UDOT received the letter or even knew of Procon's
intent to claim compensation.

In addition, Section 104.02(4)

of

the standard specifications68 requires not only written notice
but a detailed description of how the directed change will impact
the contractor including how its unit cost will be altered.
Certainly Exhibit 18-P falls short of said requirement.
Conclusion of Law number 1 is likewise in error in concluding
that the State breached the contract by changing the waste area
location without compensation.
The judgment predicated on the fact that UDOT was on
notice should be reversed and dismissed with prejudice in
accordance with the contract terms which provide for a waiver of
contractor claims for failure to give timely written notice.
principal sum of $507#300 plus interest on said sum all as
included in the judgment entered in this matter should be
deducted from the overall judgment, or in the alternative the
court should order a new trial.

^Ex. 5-Pf Sec. 104.02(4).
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The

POINT II.
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR A CHANGE IN
THE SLOPE ANGLE IS IN ERROR AND IS BASED ON
PERJURED TESTIMONY
The Court awarded Procon damages totaling $43#750.00
for costs allegedly incurred as a result of a change in the slope
angle in the "sliver cut" area of the project.

This award is in

error because Procon's representatives were informed of the
change prior to bidding and had the opportunity to bid
accordingly.
The plans for the project called for the material in
the "sliver cut" to be excavated at an angle of % to 1.

The

existing slope angle was approximately 1 to 1. UDOT's engineer,
Kirkham, realized that the plans should have called for the
excavation to match the angle of the existing slope.69

Kirkham

testified that he informed all prospective bidders who came to
view the project area prior to bid opening that the excavated
slope would be changed to conform with the existing slope.70
Kirkham stated that he so informed Procon's represent sit ives, Jim
Didericksen and Larry Fillmore, of the said change.71

The

record shows that stakes were in place in the "sliver cut"
section at the time of the site visit by Didericksen cind
Fillmore.72

Said stakes were placed to require a 1 to 1 slope

69

R. 639, 642, 643.

70

R. 643.

71

R. 643, 644, 649.

^R. 634, 649.
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and defined the upper limit of the excavation which was
significantly further up the slope than it would have been had
the stakes been placed to define a 5f to 1 angle.73
Didericksen recorded in his notes concerning the site
visit74 that "Mr. Kirkham, P.E. pointed out cut area by showing
centerline stakes cut slope 1:1 to top approx. 200'..."

He

recorded under subparagraph J. entitled "General discussion of
geology of his notes" the "sliver cut approx 200' above existing
highway."

On page 10, he recorded:

"Cut area beginning at

Sliver cut approx. 200' above exist rd. Maintain approx. 1:1
slope."

On page 11# Mr. Didericksen has a drawing which shows

the cut area and notes "1:1 slope top 200' mountain."75
Didericksen's deposition was taken on December 8, 1989. At that
time Didericksen was specifically asked whether they were
informed during the site visit that the slope removal would be at
a 1:1 angle?
that."76

His response was "I think Mr. Kirkham told us

Subsequently when asked whether his bid notes in fact

state 1 to 1 he stated:

"He did say that on the job tour.

I

remember him saying that on the job tour."77 Subsequently he
was asked about each of the notations in his bid notes which
refer to a 1 to 1 slope and conceded that they were consistent
n

R.

640# 641.

74

Ex. 8-P, p. 7.

^Ex. 8-P, pp. 9-11.
76

R. 959.

^R. 960.
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with what Kirkham told them on the job site tour prior to
bidding.78
Didericksen in his deposition claimed that ci telephone
call was made to Kirkham after the site visit and prior to the
time of bid and that Kirkham was asked about addenda to the
contract and that he instructed Procon to bid the job as drawn,
that there were no addenda.79

When pressed concerning this

alleged conversation, Didericksen admitted he did not talk to
Kirkham but that Larry Fillmore did.
trial.

Fillmore did not testify at

Kirkham testified that he did not recall any contact with

Procon or its representatives after the site visit and prior to
the time of the bid.80

Kirkham did apparently tell bidders that

he had requested that an addendum be issued.81

It is undisputed

that good engineering practice would have been to issue an
addendum for such a change prior to the bid.

UDOT specifications

do, however, allow the engineer to make such changes and require
the contractor to perform the work as directed by the engineer
subject to certain restrictions.82
At the time of trial, Didericksen changed his story and
when asked specifically whether it was his contention that Mr.
Kirkham did not tell him that he would be required to take the
78

R. 960-966.

™R. 959-966.
^R. 650.
81

R. 649.

^Ex. 5-P, Sec. 104.02.
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material out on a 1:1 slope in the sliver cut area, he stated:
"My contention is that I don't recall him saying that.
contention is that my notes say that he did not.
down that the existing cut was on a 1:1.B83

And my

That I wrote

The deposition of

Didericksen was then published and Didericksen was referred to
his deposition beginning at page 39s4

where he was questioned

concerning the slope angle change. Didericksen then attempted to
explain the inconsistency of his testimony at trial with his
prior deposition and his bid notes. A fair assessment of all the
evidence is that his trial testimony is not consistent with his
deposition or his bid notes.85
UDOT does not disagree with the premise that the trial
judge can choose to believe one witness over another when there
is a conflict in the evidence.

UDOT does, however, object to the

Court's decision to accept the testimony of James Didericksen
when it appears to be perjured or at the least highly
contradictory.
It is obvious from all of the testimony that a
discussion concerning the slope in the sliver cut occurred
between Kirkham of UDOT and Procon's representatives, Didericksen
and Fillmore at the time of the site visit.

Kirkham says the

conversation concerned a change in the slope angle from the #:1
called for in the plans to the 1:1 angle which he intended to be
^R. 619.
^R. 959.
85

R. 620-622.
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the angle of removal. The stakes which were in place in the cut
section at the time of the site visit were consistent with the
changed slope angle and Didericksen's bid notes are consistent
with this change as is his deposition testimony.

Didericksen's

testimony in his deposition involving the assertion that a phone
call was made by Fillmore of Procon to Kirkham after the site
visit and prior to bid opening is suspect.

Kirkham does not

recall any such telephone call and his alleged direction to "bid
it as drawn" is not consistent with his intent to change the
slope angle and the fact it was staked in accordance with the
change prior to the bid.

The question is why would he contradict

himself when he had already taken the effort to infornri bidders of
the change as well as having his crew set the survey stakes to
reflect the change in the slope angle?
It is conceded that UDOT should have issued an
addendum.

It is also conceded that conversations prior to the

execution of a contract are often considered as merged into the
contract.

The contract does not have an integration clause even

though it defines the contract as including a number of documents
such as the plans, standard specifications, special provisions,
etc.86

It also requires a bidder to make a site visit and

charges the bidder with things which are apparent.87

In this

case that would be the fact of the change in the slope angle.
Procon did have actual notice of the slope angle change. That
^Ex. 5-P. Sec. 105.04.
87

Ex. 5-P, Sec. 102.05.
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was obvious from the position of the slope stakes at the time of
the site visit.

It is also obvious from their own bid notes.

The notice came from oral statements made by UDOT's engineer.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in the case of Maryland
Department of General Services v. Cherry Hill Sand & Gravel. 443
A.2d 628 (Md. App. 1982), held that the parol evidence rule only
applies where the parties to a written contract agree or intend
that the writing shall be their whole agreement, and that in the
absence of an integration clause an oral clarification by the
owner's engineer was meant to be incorporated as part of the
contract.

Since Procon had notice of the change they could have,

and no doubt did, bid accordingly.

Thus the court's award of

damages for the slope angle change constitutes a "windfall11 to
Procon.

The court's award is based on Didericksen's perjured

testimony; it is, thus, clear that the trial court abused its
discretion by accepting Didericksen's testimony which clearly
contradicts his own bid notes, his own deposition testimony and
the testimony of Hugh Kirkham as well as the physical location of
the stakes in the cut section.
It was apparent from the site visit required by the
contract that the slope angle was changed from the angle
specified in the plans.

The placement of the stakes alone should

have been enough to alert a competent contractor.

In the case of

Highland Construction vs. Stevenson, et al.. 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah
1981), the Plaintiff contractor was denied relief for a claimed
change because the court determined that Highland had not
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reviewed data referenced in plan documents which would have
alerted them of the condition later encountered.

That case

differs from the present only in that here Procon was verbally
informed rather than being required to review a referenced
document to become informed.

This court's ruling in Thorn Const,

Co. v. UDOT. 508 P.2d 365 (1979) is support for UDOT's contention
in this case.

In Thorn, UDOT was held responsible for verbal

statements made by a low level employee concerning a material
site even though he had no training or experience in materials.
It was held that his statements were a warranty as to the
suitability of the material for the contractor's use.
reverse should apply.

The

Kirkham's verbal notification to Procon's

representatives that the plan slope angle was to be changed
should be binding on the bidding contractor.

This would bar

recovery for the alleged change which Procon now claims it was
not aware of contrary to the weight of the evidence.
UDOT submits that on the basis of the facts in
evidence, disregarding Didericksen's perjured testimony, that the
damage award is inappropriate and the award of $43,750 should be
reversed and stricken from the judgment together with accrued
interest on said amount.
POINT III.
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS INFLUENCED
BY PASSION OR PREJUDICE AND BY UNWARRANTED
FEELINGS OF SYMPATHY TOWARD THE RESPONDENT
The original contract between Procon and UDOT was for
the amount of $719,000.

Procon was actually paid the sum of
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$837,394.12.** The principal amount awarded to Procon by way of
judgment in this matter is $721,478.00.

In other words, the

Court more than doubled the cost of the project.
During argument of UDOT's Motion to Reconsider the
Damage Award, the court expressed concern that even the grossly
inflated amount of damages which he awarded Procon was perhaps
not enough.

Judge Young stated the following:

"The frustration

I've had with this case is really in the overall total amount.
And I still didn't solve the problem because, as I recall, the
plaintiff incurred losses of about 1.6 million and his claim was
2.2 million initially in addition to that which he was paid which
was approximately seven--well, he wasn't paid probably $719,000,
was he?

He was paid something less than that."89
On two occasions during the trial the court, while not

on the record, expressed feelings of sympathy for the plaintiff.
The court was reminded of this during argument on UDOT's posttrial motion90 and did not dispute the fact.
UDOT employed Rollins, Brown and Gunnell (RB&G), an
engineering firm to evaluate the claim filed by Procon.

They in

turn employed Norman Clyde, one of the principals of W.W. Clyde
and Company, who is a civil engineer as well as an experienced
contractor to assist in their evaluation.

They also employed a

law firm who has had experience in construction litigation to
M

R. 173.

89

R. 900-901.

90

R. 893.
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assist in evaluating the claim by Procon.

Rollins, Brown and

Gunnell concluded that the plans that UDOT provided were adequate
and that the changes in the plans by UDOT's engineer were not
sufficient to provide a basis for Procon's various claims. Their
conclusion was that Procon's problems and difficulties mainly
related to improper or inefficient construction technique, lack
of adequate equipment, and lack of know-how.

They concluded that

Procon was not entitled to any recovery.91
In his memorandum decision, Judge Young specifically
rejected the "recommendation of the evaluating group, and rejects
the conclusion that the claim should be denied, "92 but: not
until he had commented that the defendant had paid $65,000 to "an
independent team to evaluate the claim. "93 Clearly, it is
immaterial as to what UDOT paid to anyone for the purpose of
evaluating Procon's outrageous claim of $2.2 million dollars. It
is also noteworthy that the court while disclaiming that the
total costs of $1,600,000 allegedly incurred by Procbn were the
"basis for this decision"94 nevertheless awarded Procon judgment
based upon the highest testimony presented by Procon's expert
witnesses at trial and as noted above expressed frustration that
this "didn't solve the problem" because the testimony was that
Procon's total losses were 1.6 million dollars, and that Procon's
91

Ex. 34-P.

92

R. 104.

*R. 103.
*R. 103.
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initial claim was 2.2 million dollars.

Said figures were based

on total cost projections and were not seriously pursued at
trial.

The court's disregard of the perjured testimony of Jim

Didericksen as to the slope angle change in the sliver cut and
its award of $43,750 for the change as discussed under Point II
is a further indication of the court's passion and prejudice in
this matter.
This court has previously rejected the concept of total
cost as a basis for recovery except when there

is no feasible

alternative and the claimant can show that it as not responsible
for added expenses.

(See Highland Construction Co. v. Union

Pacific R. Co.. 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984)).

The record in this

case is replete with evidence of inefficiency both as to
construction technique and equipment utilization so plaintiff's
total costs are really immaterial insofar as a measure of damages
for which UDOT should be responsible.95

The court quite clearly

was persuaded that the inflated costs allegedly incurred by
Procon were justified and the court appears to have concluded
that the enormity of the alleged loss sustained by Procon some
how justifies the damage award which was based on the testimony
of Gaylord Gardner.

Mr. Gardner's testimony as reflected by

Exhibit 61-P was based on assumptions and conclusions which are
not supported by the evidence and really amounts to pure
speculation.

UDOT objected its admittance for that reason but

95

R. 753-775. In addition, Ex. 65-D and Ex. 66-D which are
diaries kept by UDOT's inspector Ferd Johnson which his testimony
was based upon.
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its objection was overruled,96

In that it failed to take into

account actual conditions as they existed, including Procon's own
internal problems, difficulties and inefficiencies which were not
the fault of UDOT, it is subject to the same objections and
criticism as is the total cost approach to damages. UDOT admits
that for purposes of proving Procon's claims it would be
appropriate to use the bid calculations as a starting point in
attempting to establish how the actual project was changed.

Mr.

Gardner's figures and calculations were, according to his own
admission, based on assumptions as to the actual work
performed97 and should not have been admitted.

Since they were

based on assumptions which are not supported by the evidence,
they are remote and speculative and inherently flawed to the
extent they incorporate things which are attributable to Procon's
own fault and are not entirely the fault or responsibility of
UDOT.

In the case of Brawley v. Esterley. Mo,, 267 S.W.2d, 655,

659, the Missouri Court stated the following with regard to
evidence based on assumptions:
The evidence must exclude guesswork,
conjecture, and speculation as to the
existence of the necessary facts. Bates v.
Brown Shoe Co.. 116 S.W.2d 31 (Mo.) when the
inference of a fact essential to a
plaintiff's recovery has no evidentiary
basis, we, and a jury, may not speculate as
to the existence of the essential fact--the
word "speculate" being here used in the sense
of reaching a conclusion by theorizing upon
assume factual premises outside of and beyond
96

R. 530, 545, 547-551, 563-578.

97

R. 563-564.
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the scope of the evidence. West v. St. Louis
Public Svc. Co., 236 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Sup.)
Since the court relied upon the testimony of Gaylord Gardner
which Gardner admitted was based on assumptions, the judgment is
flawed and should be reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial, with instructions to dismiss claims related to the change
in the waste disposal area and the sliver cut slope angle.
POINT IV.
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR OVERTIME
WORK IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE, IS NOT EQUITABLE, AND RESULTS IN A
PENALTY.
The court awarded Procon $33,000 for overtime wages
allegedly paid.

Said award was based on the premise that UDOT's

project engineer failed to respond to Procon's request for
additional time allowance during the performance of the contract.
Hugh Kirkham explained his reasons for not responding at
trial.98 As a result of UDOT's failure to respond, Procon
asserted that it incurred costs for overtime wages Which were
necessary to expedite the work in an effort to complete the work
on time.

This type of claim is typically referred to as an

acceleration claim.

(For a discussion of the concept and its

relation to delay, see Contracting & Materials Co. v. City of
Chicago. 314 N.E.2d 598 (1974).)
The contract provided for 90 working days to perform
the work.

UDOT does not charge time during the months of

98

R. 663-666, 686-688.
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December, January, and February.

Conditions during those

months are such that little work can be accomplished.

Work on

the Clay Hills Project commenced in March, 1986, and continued
into early 1987. At that time, Procon had completed the grading
and drainage but not the paving of the roadway.

Progress reports

show that as of December 1, 1986 when time charges ceased that
Procon had been charged 161 working days. The project was listed
at 85% complete.100
UDOT granted time extensions after the work was
completed and prior to trial101 totaling 14.68 days. Deducting
the 90 days allowed by the contract and the additional time
allowed from the 161 days charged left a balance of 56.32 days of
overtime which at the daily charge of $210.00 resulted in the
assessment of liquidated damages totalling $11,827.20.102
Liquidated damages were also assessed for the contractor's
failure to meet requirements under the Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise goal totaling $83,739.41.
At trial, UDOT agreed to waive its counterclaim for
both types of liquidated damages in deference to the time that
would be required to present evidence at trial.

This was

discussed in chambers and counsel for UDOT assumed that the court
understood the relationship between Procon's overtime charges and
"Ex. 5-P, S e c .
100

R. 1 6 6 .

101
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the time charged by UDOT which supported its liquidated damage
assessment.

This was again raised in UDOT's Post Trial

Motion103 in an effort to explain that Procon was still liable
for liquidated damages even after a 60-day time extension.
The court's Finding of Fact number 49 is in fact
incorrect.

Findings of Fact numbered 47 and 48, while

technically correct, are misleading.

The reason for this is that

as explained above, UDOT had granted 14.68 days of added time
after the project left Hugh Kirkham's control.

The 60-day

extension which Hugh Kirkham agreed would be reasonable is thus
reduced to 45.32 days. When that period of time is deducted from
the 56.32 days of liquidated damages actually assessed, it still
leaves a total of 11 days of liquidated damages. UDOT therefore
objected to Finding of Fact number 47 in its Post Trial
Memorandum.104
It is certainly error for the court to charge UDOT
$33,000 in damages for alleged overtime paid by Procon when the
project was still not completed at the time it was terminated in
early 1987.

It was 11 working days in excess of allowable time

at that point even after UDOT conceded a 60-day time extension
was likely due.
At trial, UDOT was willing to concede the liquidated
damages for time overrun because Hugh Kirkham had agreed that a

>R. 119-121, 166, 169-173.
H. 127-128.
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60-working day time extension would have been reasonable.105
Eleven Days at $210.00 per day only amounted to $2310.00. This
concession certainly stopped short of conceding that UDOT should
be liable for overtime incurred by the contractor in attempting
to complete the work within allowable time limits when they only
completed 85% of the total amount of work on the project.106
UDOT respectfully submits that the court's award of
$33,000 for overtime allegedly incurred by Procon should be
reversed and Procon's claim should be ordered dismissed for the
reason that it is not supported legally or equitably.
results in an unwarranted penalty to UDOT.

It in fact

If Procon had

completed the project within allowable time, then under the
doctrine of constructive acceleration, it would be appropriate to
consider compensation for overtime incurred in order to complete
the work timely.

Procon would , however, have to meet the

elements of an acceleration claim.

These are: (1) an excusable

delay; (2) request for time; (3) refusal to grant the time; (4)
express direction to accelerate performance; (5) actual
acceleration; and (6) notice.107

(See Nat Harrison Associates,

Inc. v. Gulf States Utilities Co.. 491 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1974).
In this case, the doctrine does not apply because even
when the contract time is extended by 60 days, and conceding for

10

*R. 686-688.

106

R. 166.

107

See Bruner, Allen and Sand, Acceleration. Government
Contractor Briefing Papers No. 81-2 (Federal Publications, 1981).
46

the sake of argument that Procon's overtime was incurred in an
effort to accelerate performance, the contract was still only 85%
complete when it was terminated.

In addition, there was no

evidence presented that UDOT directed Procon to accelerate its
performance and there was no notice ever communicated to UDOT of
the fact that Procon was in fact accelerating its performance and
intended to hold UDOT responsible.

The acceleration costs ought

not to be charged to UDOT and by doing so the trial court has in
effect penalized UDOT unfairly.

The acceleration may have been

to the benefit of Procon but not necessarily to UDOT.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred as a matter of law in admitting
Procon's letter of April 14, 1986 (Ex. 18-P) into evidence when
there was an inadequate foundation for said exhibit and in
concluding that UDOT was on notice of Procon's intent to claim
added compensation for extending the waste disposal area.

There

is no evidence to show that UDOT ever received the Tetter or that
its engineer was ever informed of Procon's intent to claim
compensation.

The purported author of the said letter could not

recall the letter or any of the items or events referred to in
the letter.

Under provisions of the contract, Procon's failure

to notify UDOT timely and in writing constitutes a waiver of its
right to claim added compensation for alleged damages associated
with extending the waste area.

The judgment based upon this

alleged change in the amount of $507,300 should be reversed and
the claim based on moving the waste area location should be
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dismissed no cause of action or in the alternative UDOT should be
entitled to a new trial.
The lower court erred in awarding Procon damages
totaling $43,750 for alleged damages incurred as a result of a
change in the angle of the cut slope.

Procon was informed of the

change by verbal notice prior to the bid opening.

The court's

decision is based upon the testimony of Jim Didericksen, which
testimony appears to be perjured.

Didericksen's bid notes and

his deposition testimony are consistent with the testimony of
Hugh Kirkham, UDOT's engineer that Procon was informed of said
change prior to bid opening.

The state records establish that

stakes were in place in the cut at the time of Procon's pre-bid
site inspection and that they reflected the slope angle change.
Didericksen's testimony at trial was directly contradictory to
all the other evidence before the court.
likely constitutes a double recovery.

The court's award

The Judgment of $43,750

based upon Didericksen's perjured testimony should be reversed
and the complaint should be dismissed as to said claim.
The court erred in its award of $33,000 for alleged
overtime wages which is based on its finding that Procon was
entitled to more working days in time extension than were used to
assess damages.

That is factually incorrect.

Even when

allowance is made for the extension of time which UDOT's engineer
conceded at trial, Procon exceeded allowable time by 11 working
days and only completed 85% of the project.

It is inequitable to

award damages for overtime work by Procon when there was clearly
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no benefit to UDOT.

The doctrine of constructive acceleration

does not support the court's decision.
UDOT seeks a reversal of the judgment and a dismissal
with prejudice as to the $507,300 awarded for the waste area
change, $43,750 awarded for the slope angle change , and $33,000
awarded for overtime, together with accrued interest on said sums
as set forth in the judgment.
Finally, UDOT asserts that the trial court acted
unreasonably and that its award of damages is influenced by
passion and prejudice as well as unwarranted feelings of sympathy
toward Procon which is an affront to the concept of competitive
bidding.

At the very least, UDOT should be granted a new trial

with appropriate instructions to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of November, 1992.
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